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REFORM
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I.

INTRODUCTION

At the Conference on Behavior and Business Law at the University of Tennessee
College of Law, on October 2, 2010, in Knoxville, Tennessee, Professor Edward Janger of
Brooklyn Law School presented a draft of a paper authored by him and Professor Susan
Block-Lieb, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans.2 This article follows another
article by these scholars, Demand-Side Gatekeepers in the Market for Home Loans,3 in which the
authors tell the ―story of how agency problems in the market for securitized home loans,‖
the encouragement of increased leverage, and the ―shift to capital markets financing for
home mortgages . . . created a need for both consumer protection and consumer
education—not just to protect consumers but also to protect the integrity of the capital
markets themselves.‖4 The Reforming Regulation article describes the regulatory regime for the
regulation of the market for home loans recently enacted by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act5 (the ―Dodd-Frank Act‖). The authors ―propose a
market-sensitive reading of [the Dodd-Frank Act] and suggest that the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (the ‗Bureau‘) created under the Act should be understood to balance
consumer protection with concerns for the liquidity and safety and soundness of the
financial markets.‖6
In arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act ―has the potential to create a regulatory
architecture that protects both consumers and the capital markets by distinguishing between
financial products that can safely be financed through the capital markets and those that
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pose greater risks, and should, by design, be more illiquid,‖7 their paper contains a great deal
of sensible analysis and policy suggestions. But the regulatory regime enacted by DoddFrank is predicated on a particular ―story‖ that the authors have embraced—that the
particular features of securitization were a substantial cause of the financial crisis of 2008.8
In their earlier article, Demand-Side Gatekeepers, the authors attribute this causation to a shift
from what the authors call relationship lending, which has also been called the originate and
hold model, to a capital markets or originate and distribute model for mortgage finance.9
I have two concerns with this story. First, the story told is not complete. The shift
from relationship lending to a capital markets model occurred for rational reasons that
follow naturally from the nature of the mortgage loan itself. Any sensible reform effort must
account for the nature of the mortgage loan as a long term asset that should be financed
substantially through long term financing. As I discuss below in Parts II and III, under
current law, capital markets can provide that long term financing, but relationship lenders
cannot to any significant degree. To the extent that reform efforts target the capital markets
model, those efforts should impose regulations only if they actually solve a serious problem
and if the benefits of the regulations outweigh the costs.
Second, the story may not be true. There is an ongoing debate about the causes of
the crisis in the mortgage market. Many explanations have been offered.10 It is not certain,
in my view, that securitization caused the crisis. Instead, the elements of the capital markets
that Professors Block-Lieb and Janger consider to be causes of the crisis market could well
be the result or the byproducts of the causes.
The regulatory regime described by the authors thus presents a paradox for a
conference on behavior and business law: the authors analyze (and offer suggestions
regarding) a presumably rational regulatory scheme devised by presumably rational
individuals to counteract the effects of both irrational and rational behavior by private actors
in the mortgage market—the mortgage loans borrowers, originators, securitizers, rating
agencies, and investors. Such an analysis contains a contradiction: what is the result of such
a regulatory scheme if either the regulators or the regulatory scheme fail to take into
consideration all relevant information and all relevant potential causes? Indeed, the
regulatory regime ignores the significant role that faulty government policy may have played
in creating the current crisis in the mortgage market.11
We should not eschew any regulation of the mortgage market because of these
uncertainties. Any regulatory regime that helps consumers and other market participants
7
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make better decisions will be beneficial. The risk is great, however, that the regulations that
have been proposed and enacted will produce little or no benefits, but will needlessly
increase costs for future mortgage borrowers, primarily because of a failure to appreciate the
nature of mortgage loans, the need for a reliable system of long term financing for mortgage
loans, and a serious misdiagnosis of the causes of the current crisis.
The purpose of this essay is to describe the fundamental nature of mortgage loans
that any regime for regulating the mortgage loan financing market must take into account to
permit the efficient functioning of an efficient mortgage market. Under current law—
specifically the United State Bankruptcy Code12 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act13 as
discussed below14—the financing of the vast majority of mortgage loans requires the sale of
the loans by originators of the loans to bankruptcy or insolvency remote entities that can
obtain long term financing from the capital markets. Reform efforts have largely focused on
regulating such sales and financing. Without changes in current laws and regulations that
permit originators themselves to obtain long term financing that protects investors from the
risk of acceleration of that financing because of the insolvency of the originator, the
relationship model or the hold and invest model cannot occupy any substantial part of the
mortgage finance market. Accordingly, regulatory reform of the capital markets model must
seek to improve the functioning of the market and not impose needless costs on borrowers,
therefore limiting the availability of credit.
As to the causes of the mortgage crisis, that topic is too big for this article. I will
simply raise some questions about the focus of the current reform efforts. In particular, if
the primary causes of mortgage market crisis were faulty governmental policies, the real
effect of these reform efforts may not be to protect the market from the errors of
consumers and participants in the mortgage market, but to raise the costs of the mortgage
finance market, to make mortgage finance less affordable and to render the mortgage finance
market less efficient. On the other hand, there may be a bright side: perhaps a moribund
mortgage finance market would protect the larger finance market from faulty government
policies.

II. THE NATURE OF MORTGAGE LOANS—LIQUIDITY RISK AND THE
NECESSITY FOR LONG TERM FINANCING
Finding a satisfactory way of financing residential housing in the United States has
been a challenge for almost a hundred years. The basic problem: a home, for the
homeowner, is a long term asset.15 Before the 1930s, most homeowners financed the
purchase of their homes through short term debt—a mortgage loan with a maturity date
from anywhere to 3 to 6 years (although some loans had maturities as long as 12 years), in
which the homeowner paid interest and, in some cases, some principal, expecting to
refinance or ―roll-over‖ the loan at its maturity date.16 The consequences of this mismatch
between assets and liabilities of the homeowner became apparent as a result of the
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Depression in the 1930s, when large numbers of homeowners could not refinance their
loans and defaulted.17
As I have discussed elsewhere, beginning in the 1930s, the federal government
stepped in to create the federal savings and loan association industry that encouraged the
development and use of the long term fixed rate amortizing mortgage loan. 18 This form of
loan, which has been the predominant form of single family mortgage loans since the
Depression,19 solves the mismatch of assets and liabilities for the homeowner. For example,
a 30 year amortizing mortgage loan in the amount of $100,000 bearing an annual interest rate
of 6% will require a monthly payment of $599.55 (and a slightly larger payment on the last
month). For the first monthly payment, the accrued interest will be paid in full—$500—and
$99.55 will be applied to reduce the principal balance.20 Each month thereafter, the monthly
payment will pay the accrued interest and reduce the outstanding principal balance. The last
monthly payment ($600.08) will be sufficient to pay the accrued interest ($2.99) on the
remaining balance ($597.09) and that remaining principal balance. Accordingly, as long as
the borrower can afford to make the monthly payments, the borrower will never default.
Federal savings and loan associations funded these mortgage loans through short
term deposits (and savings associations and banks continue to do so) and held the mortgage
loans in their portfolio. Indeed, they were required to hold mortgage loans. Unfortunately,
this financing scheme only moved the problem of the mismatch in assets and liabilities one
step up the mortgage finance ladder. As long as short term interest rates remained stable,
however, the system worked. This system has been referred to as the ―3-6-3‖ system: the
savings association would borrow from depositors at 3%, lend to mortgagors at 6%, and the
officers were on the golf course by 3 pm.21
Unfortunately, the run up of inflation in the 1960s and 1970s caused the entire
system to crash. Any owner of fixed rate loans faces the risk that the value of the loans in its
portfolio will decrease if market interest rates rise. For example, the value of a 30 year
amortizing mortgage loan with a fixed annual interest rate of 6% will lose more than 10% of
its value if market interest rates for comparable loans increase two percentage points to
8%.22 For this reason, inflation and increase in markets interest rates through 1981 caused
the entire savings and loan industry to become insolvent.23
The solution for this defective structure is either (a) the origination of mortgage
loans by entities that can hold these long term mortgage loans assets and finance them with
long term liabilities or match them with long term liabilities—such as life insurance
17
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Freddie Mac] (noting that since 1984, the fixed rate mortgage loan represented more than 70% of all mortgage
loans, and that adjustable rate mortgage loans exceeded more than 50% of the originations in only three years).
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companies or pension funds—or (b) the origination of mortgage loans and the sale of the
mortgage loans to entities that can hold long term assets. Accordingly, beginning in the
1970s, Congress authorized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy mortgage loans from
originators and issue pass-through securities payable from the mortgage loans but bearing a
guarantee against default (for which guarantees the borrower paid a guarantee fee included in
the interest rate). These securities could then be sold into the capital markets to entities that
could bear the risk of changes in market value because of changes in market interest rates.
In addition, for mortgage loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could not buy,
such as loans whose balance exceeded the statutory limits imposed on Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, the market created private securitization in which originators sold mortgage
loans to sponsors of securitizations (or were themselves the sponsors) that sold loans to a
securitization trustee and caused the issuance into the capital markets of securities backed by
the mortgage loans. The credit enhancement for these securities was typically provided
through dividing the securities into senior and subordinate tranches. The subordinate
tranches, which would have a higher interest rate, would bear any losses before the senior
tranches. Accordingly, the senior tranches would receive high ratings—typically AAA—by
rating agencies.24
By carving up the cash flow from the mortgage loans into different tranches, the
sponsors could also devise securities that appealed to different investor preferences for
market value risk as well as credit risk. For example, the senior securities would typically be
issued in tranches in which the first tranche would receive all of the principal payments until
paid in full, and then later tranches of the senior securities would similarly receive all
principal until paid in full. Hence, the cash flow from a pool of mortgage loans—itself with
a 30 year legal maturity—could be used to create securities with short, medium and long
term expected maturities. In the case of private securitization, subordinate classes would
typically be issued to investors wanting more yield and willing to take more risk (or be
retained by the sponsor through a bankruptcy remote subsidiary).
The public and private securitization of mortgage loans seemed to solve the
problem of matching long term mortgage loan assets with long term liabilities. Both the
public and private securitization grew through the 1980s and 1990s, while the holdings of
mortgage loans by savings associations declined. Specifically, from the end of 1945 through
the end of 1958, the holdings by saving associations of single family, first lien mortgage
loans, based on outstanding principal balance, grew from 38% to 50% of all single family
mortgage loans and stayed above 50% until the end of 1980, when it began to fall quickly to
30% by the end of 1987, below 20% by the end of 1991, below 10% by the end of 2001, and
to 7% by the end of 2006, just at the peak of the real estate bubble.25

See Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1667 (2004)
[hereinafter Security of Securitization].
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In contrast, as Table 1 below shows, beginning in 1971, the percentage of single
family first lien mortgage loans held by the Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and the
Farmers Home Administration26 (the latter two holding much smaller amounts of mortgage
loans) in mortgage pools backing mortgage-backed securities grew from 2.1% to 12.1% in
1976, to 30% at the end of 1986 to over 52% at the end of 2001. Then, from the end of
2001 to the end of 2006, the percentage declined to 39%. In addition, the percentage of
single family first lien mortgage loans held by issuers of asset-backed securities grew from
1% as of the end of 1986 to 8.6% as of the end of 2001, and then grew to 21.9% as of the
end of 2006, its peak.
Curiously, the percentage of single family first lien mortgage loans held by
commercial banks between the end of 1945 and the end of 2010 held fairly steady between
13% and 17% (except for the years 1946 through 1955, when the percentages exceeded 17%
and reached 22.3% as of the end of 1947). Presumably, commercial banks, whose business
activities are more diversified than savings and loans associations, could afford to hold onto
these long term assets. Also, because savings associations and commercial banks could
finance their holdings through federally-insured deposits, the percentages for both types of
financial institutions could reflect inventory being held for sale or securitization. On the
other hand, the percentage of such mortgage loans held by life insurance companies peaked
at the end of 1951 at 20.5% and thereafter declined to 13.3% as of the end of 1966 and then
to less than 1% as of the end of 1986.
After the peak of the single family housing real estate bubble in 2006, discussed
below, private securitization began to decline, and the bursting of the bubble in 2008 caused
a dramatic decline in both total originations and the private securitization of mortgage loans.
During 2008 and 2009, the ―net change in assets‖ for all single family first lien mortgage
loans equaled a negative $214.2 billiion; that is, the principal balance of outstanding
mortgage loans declined by $214.2 more than the original principal balance of new
originations.27 During the same time, the ―net change in assets‖ for mortgage loans held by
issuers of asset-backed securities was a negative $607.9 billion.28 For this reason, as noted in
the table below, the balance of mortgage loans held by such issuers declined 6.7 percentage
points in three years from 21.9% to 15.2%. Because the balance held by savings institutions
also declined four percentage points, the slack was taken up by the government sponsored
enterprises (―GSEs‖), whose net holdings increased by $891.2 in 2008 and 2009,29 and
whose holding increased to 59% at significant cost to the federal government and ultimately
taxpayers and future mortgagors.
The change in the types of entities that hold mortgage loans is illustrated by the
following chart:

calculation); FRB OUTSTANDINGS 1955-1964, at 87, tbl. L.218 ll. 5, 12 (same calculation); FRB OUTSTANDINGS
1945-1954, at 87, tbl. L.218 ll. 5, 12 (same calculation), all available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1.
26

See FRB OUTSTANDINGS 2005-2009, supra note 25, at 81 tbl. L.218 note 1.
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See id. at 42, tbl. F.218, ll. 5, 22 (the net of l. 5 less l. 22, to remove the home equity and junior liens).
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See id. at 42, tbl. F.218, ll. 19, 26 (the net of l. 19 less l. 26, to remove the home equity and junior liens).
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Table 130
Percentage Holdings of Single Family First Lien Mortgage Loans

GSE

Agency
& GSE
MBS
Pools

Sav.
Inst.

Life
Ins.
Cos.

Issuers
of MBS

Comm.
Banks

Total $
(millions)

1946

0.0%

0.0%

38.0%

11.0%

0.0%

19.8%

23,074

1951

0.0%

0.0%

38.3%

20.5%

0.0%

19.9%

51,745

1956

0.7%

0.0%

47.8%

20.4%

0.0%

16.5%

98,686

1961

1.9%

0.0%

54.1%

16.7%

0.0%

13.0%

153,976

1966

1.9%

0.1%

56.6%

13.0%

0.0%

14.1%

232,689

1971

5.5%

2.1%

56.6%

7.7%

0.0%

15.1%

318,361

1976

5.9%

7.0%

57.4%

3.0%

0.0%

16.1%

534,962

1981

6.2%

12.1%

48.0%

1.7%

0.0%

16.3%

1,030,173

1986

6.1%

30.0%

32.9%

0.8%

1.0%

13.5%

1,729,444

1991

5.1%

44.3%

18.8%

0.5%

3.8%

13.0%

2,552,323

1996

6.0%

49.3%

13.5%

0.2%

6.2%

15.5%

3,405,863

2001

4.4%

52.7%

10.4%

0.1%

8.6%

14.7%

5,219,583

2006

4.9%

39.0%

7.8%

0.1%

21.9%

15.2%

9,389,461

2009

4.5%

53.6%

3.8%

0.1%

15.2%

15.3%

9,828,911

End
of
Year

These changes in the holders of mortgage loans reflect a rationale response to a
significant risk inherent in mortgage loans. Any saving association in the business of making
mortgage loans that wanted to survive could not hold onto them. It had to ―sell, sell, sell.‖
Those who decry the originate and distribute model and tout the benefits of dealing with the

See FRB OUTSTANDINGS for years 1945-2009, supra note 25, at 87, tbl. L.218, ll. 5, 12-14, 17-19, 22-24, 26
(netting out home equity and junior liens).
30
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Jimmy Stewart character in It’s a Wonderful Life31 and the Bailey Building and Loan32 have
failed to account for this significant risk inherent in mortgage finance.
The originate and distribute model may create a risk of agency problems. The
question is to what extent are these agency problems greater than or different from any
other type of property that is manufactured and sold. Many involved in the sales and
distribution system for numerous types of property receive up front fees and bear little legal
risk from the sales other than liability for breach of express or implied warranties. Were the
up front fees and the lack of liability for mortgage loans sufficiently different from other
types of property that those fees need to be regulated and increased liability for the sold
assets need to be imposed? Is the reliance on representations and warranties for the sale of
mortgage loans—typically much more extensive than those given to buyers of other types of
property—insufficient? Should we, the smart regulators, limit the types of mortgage loans
that can be originated and sold? These issues need to be addressed wisely. They should be
done so in the context of and on the basis of the need to allow for the efficient origination
and sale of mortgage loans. Further, any stable system of mortgage finance must provide for
the financing of mortgage loans by entities who can match their long term mortgage assets
with their long term financing liabilities.

III. THE NATURE OF MORTGAGE LOANS—PROTECTING INVESTORS FROM
ACCELERATION RISK
As noted above, one of the risks inherent in the long term fixed rate mortgage loan
is that the value of the mortgage loans will decline if the market interest rates increase.
Financing mortgage loans therefore requires finding long term investors that can account for
this risk. Another risk that these long term investors face, however, is that market interest
rates will fall, and the value of both the mortgage loans and any long term financing payable
from the mortgage loans will also rise. When interest rates rise, borrowers will seek to
refinance the debt that carries higher rates with debt that has a lower rate.
The ability of a borrower to refinance its debt is essentially a one-way option. If
interest rates rise, the borrower and the investor are locked in, to the benefit of the borrower
and the detriment of the lender. If interest rates fall, however, a refinancing by a borrower
gives the lender the par value of its investment and not the market value. For example, a 30year $100,000 mortgage loan bearing interest at a fixed rate of 6% would be worth about
$125,000 if mortgage interest rates fell to 4% two years later and the mortgagor could not
prepay the mortgage. Mortgage loans, however, are generally prepayable. Depending on
what assumptions an investor makes about the rate of prepayment, the mortgage loan
described above may be worth only about $106,000. Hence lenders take the downside risk
but do not get the upside benefit from change in interests rates. This risk is priced into the
initial interest rate charged for each mortgage loan.33
One way to ameliorate the risk of prepayment is to require the borrower to pay a
prepayment penalty or pay a ―make whole‖ premium if it seeks to repay before a certain
31 IT‘S A WONDERFUL LIFE

(RKO Radio Pictures 1946).

See Lessons from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, supra note 18, at 794 (setting forth the changes in the present value
of a pool of mortgage loans caused by an increase or decrease of market rates 2 years after origination of the
mortgage loans, depending on the different assumptions about the rate of prepayment that may arise because of
the changes in the market rate).
32

33

See id. at 790.
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time. Such prepayment penalties or make whole premiums are common in commercial
loans and corporate and governmental revenue bonds. To the extent that a regulatory
regime prohibits such prepayment penalties, the regime is simply engaging in price control.
Investors that provide long term financing for the origination of single family
mortgage loans must live with the risk of prepayment of the mortgage loans. They can do so
because there is sufficient information available that allows investors to price for the likely
risk. Investors that provide such long term financing, however, also seek to be protected
from prepayment or acceleration of their investments for reasons other than the prepayment
of the underlying mortgage loans. For example, imagine that a mortgage loan originator—
say, TEP Acceptance Corp.—borrows money from a lender pursuant to a long term debt
obligation so that it can originate and hold a pool of single family mortgage loans. It quite
happily grants the lender a security interest in that specific pool to secure the debt, and the
debt is expected to be paid from the pool. Assume that the pool performs well, and the cash
flow from the mortgage loans will be sufficient for the timely payment of principal and
interest on the long term debt. So far, so good.
Unfortunately, the originator could get into financial difficulty for reasons unrelated
to the pool of mortgage loans and the pool‘s ability to repay the secured debt. Perhaps
another pool of mortgage loans goes bad, the cash flow is not sufficient to repay a separate
lender with a security interest in that pool, and the other lender starts to foreclose on the
other pool. Or an investment in a real estate development goes bad, and other creditor seek
to foreclose on the originator‘s assets. Or an employee commits a tort for which there is
insufficient insurance. For any of these and other reasons, it may be necessary for the
originator, TEP Acceptance Corp., to file for bankruptcy.
Such a bankruptcy filing will adversely affect the fully-secured lender whose debt
was being paid in a variety of ways.34 First, a bankruptcy filing accelerates all debts of
creditors, including the secured lender whose long term debt is otherwise being paid, at the
par amount or face amount of the debt, regardless of the market value of the debt. 35
Second, although the lender‘s debt is accelerated, an automatic stay of indeterminate
duration will prevent the lender from getting any payments on its debt or exercising its
remedies against the collateral securing the debt, until the bankruptcy case is resolved
through liquidation, confirmation of a reorganization plan, or dismissal, unless the lender has
grounds for relief from the automatic stay.36
The lender to the originator may be able to price for this bankruptcy risk, but the
price is likely to be high and the costs to the originator are likely substantial. One study that
contrasted the cost of a securitization of automobile loans against the corporate debt of a
highly rated originator of automobile loans provides an example of these costs. This study,
See generally Security of Securitization, supra note 24, at 1658, 1669-71; see also Thomas E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in
Securitization: A Prudent Legal Structure and a Fanciful Critique, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 621-23 (2008).
34

See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (if objection to a proof of claim of a creditor is made, ―the court, after notice and a
hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow
such claim in such amount [with exceptions not relevant]‖).
35

See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (providing that the filing of a petition operates as a stay of ―any act to collect, assess,
or recover a [prepetition] claim against the debtor‖); id. § 362(c), (d) (providing that the stay continues until the
case is closed or dismissed or relief is granted by the court); id. §§ 725-726 (providing for distribution to creditors
in chapter 7); id. § 1123 (providing for distribution in chapter 11); id. § 549 (avoidance of unauthorized post
petition transfers).
36
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done in 1987, compared the costs of a $4 billion private securitization of automobile loans
by General Motors Acceptance Corporation in 1986 and the costs of the issuance of
corporate debt (then rated AA+) of GMAC. This study showed a substantial savings for the
securitization of about 130 basis points, or 1.38% percentage points, annually on the
declining balance of the pool.37 Significantly, practically all of the cost savings derived from
the fact that, unlike the private securitization, GMAC had to provide a substantial amount of
equity behind its corporate debt to warrant a AA+ credit rating, and the cost of this equity
equaled 128 basis points, or 1.28% percentage points, of its debt. This equity was, in
essence, necessary to provide assurance at the AA+ level that GMAC would not become a
debtor in bankruptcy.
The mortgage loan originator, such as TEP Acceptance Corp., can avoid these
costs—which it would have to pass on to its borrowers if it were to stay in business—by
selling its loans to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or a private securitization trust.38 In all three
cases, the loans are placed in a trust and pass through securities are issued to investors.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue a guarantee for their securities, and the private
securitization trusts are structured primarily with internal credit enhancement that enables
the issuance of highly-rated senior securities. In the case of public securitizations, the
guarantee by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac render the bankruptcy risk of the originator
irrelevant (although the transfers are generally structured as true sales similar to the sales in
private securitizations). Private securitizations protect the investors from the bankruptcy
risk of the originator because the sponsors of the securitization structure the sale of the
loans from the originator as a ―true sale‖ that removes the mortgage loans from any
potential bankruptcy estate of the originator.39
Depository institutions like savings institutions and banks, whose deposits are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, that originate mortgage loans also
face similar issues. Although they can finance their originations out of their deposits, long
term direct financing by these institutions also presents acceleration risk if the FDIC is
appointed as receiver or conservator of the depository institution.40
Again, the originate and distribute model is necessary, at least under current law, to
protect investors from a significant risk inherent in the long term financing of mortgage
loans.41 It is no accident that since 1979, when the current Bankruptcy Code went into
See James A. Rosenthal & Juan M. Ocampo, Analyzing the Economic Benefits of Securitized Credit, 1988 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 32, 36-40 (1992).
37

Mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration can also be placed into trusts that issue
securities guarantee by Ginnie Mae. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1717(a)(2)(A), (b)(1), 1721, 1723(a).
38

See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (providing that the commencement of a case creates an estate, and the estate consists
of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case‖); see also Security
of Securitization, supra note 24, at 1672-78.
39

See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (providing for the appointment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as
receiver or conservator of the insured depository institution); id. § 1821(d) (empowering the FDIC as a receiver
or conservator to succeed to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the depository institution, to take over the
assets of and to operate the depository institution, as receiver to liquidate the depository institution and to realize
on its assets, to pay all valid obligations of the depository institution, and to determine claims in accordance with
the FDI Act).
40

Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 relieved short term lenders to mortgage originators from the
risks of the automatic stay and other risks. See Thomas E. Plank, Toward a More Efficient Bankruptcy Law: Mortgage
Financing Under the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 641, 659-67 (2007).
41
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effect, entities that are eligible to be debtors in bankruptcy (other than bankruptcy remote
issuers of asset-backed securities) have never held more than 11.3% of single family
mortgage loans, and since 1989 have held less than 10%.42 Because of the costs imposed on
secured creditors that lend to persons that are eligible to be debtors under the Bankruptcy
Code, those persons cannot feasibly engage in the long term financing of mortgage loans.

IV. REGULATORY REFORM AND THE ROLE OF SECURITIZATION IN THE
MORTGAGE MARKET CRISIS
As noted above, private securitization took an increasing share of the financing of
mortgage loans. Professors Block-Lieb and Janger,43 as have others,44 have attributed the
mortgage market crises to this growth of securitization and certain features of securitization.
Most of the regulatory reform efforts have been directed to these presumed defects in the
securitization process. If securitization were the cause of the mortgage loan market crisis,
then this regulatory reform should protect consumers and investors from the machinations
of originators, sponsors of securitizations, underwriters, and rating agencies. However, what
if the growth of securitization and its perceived defects did not cause the crisis? What if the
perceived defects in the securitization process were simply a result or by-product of a
mortgage market crisis caused primarily by federal governmental policies? What if the
market crisis were caused by the Federal Reserve Board keeping interest rates so low from
2001 to 2003, the defects in the design and operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and
the governmental push for increasing home ownership?
If federal government policies were the primary cause of the mortgage market crisis,
regulatory reforms that limit private actors in financing mortgage loans through the capital
markets will most likely only increase the cost of mortgage financing without providing any
offsetting benefits. If federal policy caused the crisis, the only benefit of the regulatory
reform would be to increase the costs of mortgage financing to save consumers and
investors from federal governmental actions.
I am skeptical of claims that securitization was a primary cause of the mortgage
crisis. I do not propose to refute that proposition here. My purpose is more modest: to
provide information that questions the plausibility of the assertion that the growth of
securitization or the alleged defects in the securitization process would be sufficient to cause
the crisis.
First, the following table sets forth the increases in the principal balance of single
family first lien mortgage loans,45 the increase in home prices as measured by the Case

See, e.g. FRB OUTSTANDINGS for the years 1945-2009, supra note 25, at 87, tbl L. 218, ll. 5-26 (net of home
equity loans). These entities are nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business, nonfarm noncorporate business,
households, private pension funds, finance companies and real estate investment trusts.
42

43

See supra notes 3 and 7 and accompanying text.

See generally Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course
Doctrine, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 503 (2002); Levitin and Wachter, supra note 10.
44

45

See Table 1 supra.
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Schiller U.S. National Home Price index,46 and the Consumer Price Index-All Urban
Consumers calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor.47
Table 248
Increases in Total Single Family First Lien Mortgage Loans, Case Schiller US National
Home Price Index, and Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Col:

1

2

3

4

5

6

End of
Year

Total
Mortgage
Loan
Balance

Annual
Increase
Total
Mortgage
Loan
Balance

CS Home
Price
Index

Annual
Increase
Home
Price
Index

CPI

Ann. Inc.
CPI

1987

1,927,700

11.5%

66.18

1988

2,162,113

12.2%

71.22

7.62%

120.5

4.4%

1989

2,368,907

9.6%

75.37

5.83%

126.1

4.7%

1990

2,391,619

1.0%

74.59

-1.03%

133.8

6.1%

1991

2,552,323

6.7%

74.65

0.08%

137.9

3.1%

1992

2,724,640

6.8%

74.74

0.12%

141.9

2.9%

1993

2,890,295

6.1%

75.91

1.57%

145.8

2.8%

1994

3,056,124

5.7%

77.89

2.61%

149.7

2.7%

1995

3,207,918

5.0%

79.51

2.08%

153.5

2.5%

1996

3,405,863

6.2%

81.18

2.10%

158.6

3.3%

1997

3,605,586

5.9%

84.80

4.46%

161.3

1.7%

1998

3,949,084

9.5%

90.81

7.09%

163.9

1.6%

1999

4,348,620

10.1%

98.29

8.24%

168.3

2.7%

2000

4,698,620

8.0%

107.90

9.78%

174.0

3.4%

2001

5,219,583

11.1%

116.23

7.72%

176.7

1.6%

115.4

See Case Schiller U.S. National Home Price index, 3rd Quarter 2010 (data as of Jan. 25, 2011), available at
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en/us/?indexId=SPUSACASHPIDFF--P-US---- (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
46

See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX-ALL URBAN
CONSUMERS (CPI-U) (as of Jan. 14, 2011), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests /cpi/cpiai.txt (last
visited Feb. 13, 2011).
47

Columns 2, 4, and 6 present the annual increase in, respectively, the mortgage balances and the home price and
CPI indices in the preceding column.
48
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Table 248
Increases in Total Single Family First Lien Mortgage Loans, Case Schiller US National
Home Price Index, and Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Col:

1

2

3

4

5

6

End of
Year

Total
Mortgage
Loan
Balance

Annual
Increase
Total
Mortgage
Loan
Balance

CS Home
Price
Index

Annual
Increase
Home
Price
Index

CPI

Ann. Inc.
CPI

2002

5,912,512

13.3%

128.58

10.63%

180.9

2.4%

2003

6,646,508

12.4%

142.29

10.66%

184.3

1.9%

2004

7,492,629

12.7%

163.06

14.60%

190.3

3.3%

2005

8,467,564

13.0%

186.97

14.66%

196.8

3.4%

2006

9,389,461

10.9%

186.44

-0.28%

201.8

2.5%

2007

10,035,969

6.9%

170.75

-8.42%

210.0

4.1%

2008

9,957,255

-0.8%

139.42

-18.35%

210.2

0.1%

2009

9,829,911

-1.3%

136.04

-2.42%

215.9

2.7%
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Table 3 sets forth a comparison of the increases described in Table 2.
Table 349
Comparison of increases in total single family first lien mortgage loans, Case Schiller US
National Home Price index, and consumer price index
Col:

7

8

9

10

End of
Year

Δ:

Δ:

Δ:

Δ:

Mtg Balance
Less CS
Index

Lag Mtg Balance:

Lag CS Index:

Mtg Balance Less
CS Index for
Previous Year

Mtg Balance for
Previous Year Less
CS Index

CS Index Less
CPI

1987
1988

4.6%

3.2%

1989

3.8%

2.0%

6.4%

1.2%

1990

2.0%

-4.8%

10.6%

-7.1%

1991

6.6%

7.7%

0.9%

-3.0%

1992

6.7%

6.7%

6.6%

-2.8%

1993

4.5%

6.0%

5.2%

-1.2%

1994

3.1%

4.1%

3.5%

-0.1%

1995

2.9%

2.4%

6.6%

-0.5%

1996

4.1%

4.1%

2.9%

-1.2%

1997

1.4%

3.8%

1.7%

2.8%

1998

2.4%

5.0%

-1.2%

5.5%

1999

1.9%

3.0%

1.3%

5.6%

2000

-1.8%

-0.2%

0.3%

6.4%

2001

3.4%

1.3%

0.3%

6.2%

2002

2.7%

5.6%

0.5%

8.3%

2003

1.7%

1.8%

2.6%

8.8%

Column 7 sets forth the net of the annual percentage increase in the mortgage balance minus the annual
percentage increase in the Case Schiller home price index for the same year. Column 8 sets forth the net of the
annual percentage increase in the mortgage balance for the year indicated minus the annual percentage increase in
the Case Schiller home price index for the preceding year. Hence, Column 8 compares the increases in mortgage
loan balance and home price indices by lagging the increase in the mortgage balance. Column 9 does the reverse
of column 8. It sets forth the net of the annual percentage increase in the mortgage balance for the previous year
minus the annual percentage increase in the Case Schiller home price index for the year indicated. This column
lags the differences home price index. Finally, Column 10 shows the net result of the annual percentage increase
in the Case Schiller home price index minus the annual percentage increase in the consumer price index for the
same year.
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Table 349
Comparison of increases in total single family first lien mortgage loans, Case Schiller US
National Home Price index, and consumer price index
Col:

7

8

9

10

End of
Year

Δ:

Δ:

Δ:

Δ:

Mtg Balance
Less CS
Index

Lag Mtg Balance:

Lag CS Index:

Mtg Balance Less
CS Index for
Previous Year

Mtg Balance for
Previous Year Less
CS Index

CS Index Less
CPI

2004

-1.9%

2.0%

-2.2%

11.3%

2005

-1.7%

-1.6%

-2.0%

11.2%

2006

11.2%

-3.8%

13.3%

-2.8%

2007

15.3%

7.2%

19.0%

-12.5%

2008

17.6%

7.6%

25.3%

-18.4%

2009

1.1%

17.1%

1.6%

-5.1%

Table 2 illustrates the magnitude of the real estate bubble. It shows, for example,
the tremendous growth in the nominal balance of outstanding mortgage loans, from $5.2
trillion in 2001 to $9.4 trillion at the end of 2006, an 81% increase, and a tremendous growth
in the Case Schiller national housing price index from 116.23 at the end of 2001 to 186.44 at
the end of 2006, a 60% increase. So, for the five year period, nominal mortgage balance
increased faster than the housing price index. This fact might suggest that the increase in
mortgage balance pushed the increase in housing prices. However, on a year by year basis,
column 7 of Table 3 shows that the disparity in the increase of nominal mortgage loan
balance over the increase in housing price index occurred in 2001-2003. Again this might
suggest that the increase in mortgage loan balance was pushing up housing prices in these
years, but, as noted below,50 in these years the increase in the amount of mortgage loans held
by issuers of asset backed securities was modest. In 2004 and 2005, however, mortgage loan
balance increased slower than housing prices, during the years when the amount of mortgage
loans held by issuers of asset backed securities increased by larger amounts. In 2006, the
mortgage loan balance continued to go up, but housing prices started to flatten. This data
suggests that increases in mortgage loan balances followed increases in home prices. If so,
how could increased mortgage loan supply cause the increase in home real estate prices, and
thus, the bubble?
Further evidence suggesting that the increase in mortgage balance followed the
increase in home prices, and that the increase in home prices did not follow the increase in
mortgage balance, is shown by columns 8 and 9. If we compare the annual increase in the
mortgage balance with the annual increase in home prices for the previous year, set forth in
column 8, we see that mortgage balance increased more than the home prices in every year
50

See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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from 2001 through 2004, and the largest positive difference—5.6%--in the increase occurred
in 2002. Only in 2005 and 2006, were mortgage balance increases lower than the increase in
housing prices the previous year. Hence, as home prices for the previous year increased,
there were larger increases in mortgage loan balances the following years of 2001-2004.
On the other hand, if we compare the annual increase in the mortgage balance for
the previous year with the annual increase in home prices for the year indicated, set forth in
column 9, we see much smaller differences in the increases during 2001-2003 and negative
differences in 2004 and 2005. Hence, increases in mortgage loans balances in 2000-2004 had
little affect on housing price increases in 2001-2005. Of course, in 2006, when housing
prices actually declined for the year, if we compare the increase in mortgage loan balance for
2006 against the decrease in home price for 2006, column 7, we also see that the mortgage
loan balance still increased . Moreover, we also see an increase in mortgage balance for 2005
as compared to the decrease in home prices for 2006, in column 9. This fact suggests that
increases in mortgage balance lagged behind the increases in home prices. Further, this
increase was not necessarily reckless. In comparing the increase in mortgage loan balance
for 2006 against the increase in home price for 2005 in column 8, we see a decline of 3.8%.
Hence, the market was starting to get the message that home prices were not increasing, and
therefore, mortgage balances should not increase as much as they had in the past.
Table 3 along with Table 2 also shows the tremendous increase in housing prices
over the increases in the consumer price index: for the years 1998-2001, six percentage
points; for the year 2002, eight percentage points; for the year 2003, nine percentage points;
and for the years 2004-2005, 11 percentage points. Further, housing prices in 2004-2005
increased faster than both mortgage loan balances and the consumer price index.
It is interesting to contrast this information with the short term interest rates during
2001-2003 and the increases in the mortgage balances held by issuers of asset-backed
securities during the years 2001-2006.
First, from September 2001 through January 2005, the one year treasury bond rate
was below 3%, and from July 2002 through May 2004, it was below 2%.51 Accordingly,
during this time it was below the combination of the theoretical ―real‖ interest rate—that is,
the rate at which lenders would lend and borrower would borrow if there were no inflation
or risk of default—of 2.5 to 3% and the inflation rate as measured by the consumer price
index (shown in column 6 above). In effect, when the interest rate charged to borrower is
less than the real interest rate plus inflation, lenders are paying borrowers to borrow.
Lenders may well do so when their alternatives are more costly.
During this time, there was a significant increase in the amount of mortgage loans
held by issuers of asset-backed securities. In the years 2001, 2002, and 2003, the ―net change
in assets‖ for single family first lien mortgage loans held by such issuers was, respectively,
$78 billion, $80 billion, and $122 billion; that is, the original principal balance of new
originations acquired by issuers of asset-backed securities exceeded the reductions of the
outstanding principal balance of outstanding mortgage loans held by such issuers in each of
those years by, respectively, $78 billion, $80 billion, and $122 billion.52 In 2004, 2005, and
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MARKET YIELD ON U.S. TREASURY SECURITIES AT 1-YEAR
CONSTANT
MATURITIES,
QUOTED
ON
INVESTMENT
BASIS,
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Monthly/H15_TCMNOM_Y1.txt (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
51

See FRB OUTSTANDINGS 1995-2004, supra note 25, at 42, tbl. F.218, ll. 19, 26 (the net of l. 19 less l. 26, to
remove the home equity and junior liens).
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2006, this amount increased, respectively, to $381 billion, $566 billion, and $502 billion.53
For 2004-2006, these are large numbers to be sure. But Tables 2 and 3 indicate that these
increases were not driving up housing prices, but rather, the increase in housing prices were
driving up these increases in mortgage loan balances held by issuers of asset-backed
securities.
Further, the size of the increases in holdings of mortgage loans by issuers of assetbacked securities must be contrasted with the likely effect of the low interest rates on the
United States economy and the total amount of debt outstanding during this time. The total
amount of debt grew from $29 trillion in 2001 to $45 trillion in 2006.54 Much of this total
debt need not be short term debt. Still, what is the economic effect of short term interest
rates that, for the years of 2001-2003, were below the real rate of interest and inflation on
the economy?55 How does this economic effect interplay with an increasing issuance of
mortgage loans acquired by issuers of asset- backed securities? It seems dubious that the
large issuance of private mortgage backed securities could have caused the dramatic increases
in home prices in the years 2004 and 2006, and the slight decrease in housing prices in 2006
would not be explained by the net increase in mortgage holdings in 2006 of $502 billion.
By experience and education, I am skeptical of more regulation. Sometimes
regulation is a good thing. More often, however, regulation enables entrenched interest
groups to protect their own interests without regard to the greater good. In my view, those
who claim that regulation in a particular setting is good thing bear the burden of proving that
the benefits outweigh the costs. This is a heavy burden.
Free markets are self correcting. If participants in the market make mistakes—and
they often do—the participants learn from their mistakes, and the markets correct fairly
quickly. An unregulated securitization market will adjust. Eventually, consumers and
investors will learn what they can afford to buy.
On the other hand, regulatory regimes are not self correcting. When the regulators
make mistakes, they do not correct those mistakes by themselves. First, regulators bear very
little of the cost of the mistakes in the system. They have no built in incentive to correct
mistakes. Second, the interest groups that have adjusted to any specific regulatory regime
have no incentive to correct the regime to make it more efficient for the benefit of all.
Accordingly, correcting a faulty regulatory regime requires much greater effort. In the
meantime, costs go up, with no offsetting benefits.
Oh well. At least I have my 4.25% fixed rate 15 year mortgage. I am set.
Oh wait. I have 5 children who may need help in buying a house that the brave new
world of mortgage finance may otherwise put out of their reach. Aggghhhh!!!

See FRB OUTSTANDINGS 1995-2004 and 2005-2009, supra note 25, at 42, tbl. F.218, ll. 19, 26 (the net of l. 19
less l. 26, to remove the home equity and junior liens).
53

54

See id. at 51, tbl. L. 1 (Credit Market Debt Outstanding), ll. 1.

John B. Taylor has analyzed this issue extensively and places most of the blame for the financial crisis on the
Federal Reserve Board keeping short term interest rates too low. See JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK:
HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS (2009), discussed and criticized in FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 103; Levitin & Wachter, supra note 10, at 3,
46-49; and Wallison, supra note 10, at 458.
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